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PREVIEW; State v. Smith: Constitutionality of Lifetime Satellite
Location Monitoring Sentencing Conditions
Forrest Graves*
Oral argument is scheduled for Wednesday, February 17, 2021, at 9:30
a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek
Justice Building, in Helena, Montana. Deborah S. Smith is expected to
argue on behalf of Appellant Wesley Smith (“Smith”), and Jonathan M.
Krauss is expected to argue on behalf of Appellee State of Montana
(“State”).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue before the Court is whether Montana Code Annotated § 455-625(4)(b), which mandates lifetime satellite location monitoring (“GS
monitoring”) for certain classes of sexual offenders, violates the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article II, sections 10, 11, 22, and 28 of the Montana Constitution. This
oral argument presents an opportunity for the Court to rule on an issue that
has been the subject of several recent court decisions in other states.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Smith in June 2017 of felony sexual abuse of
children1 pertaining to his 9-year-old stepdaughter.2 The district court
sentenced Smith to 100 years in the Montana State Prison with 80 of those
years suspended3 and designated Smith as a Level I sexual offender with
a low risk of re-offending.4
No parole restrictions were imposed.5 After serving his 20-year prison
sentence, if he has not been paroled, Smith will be discharged to probation,
during which time his remaining 80-year suspended sentence may be
discharged under certain circumstances.6
Montana’s Sexual Abuse of Children law establishes sentencing
guidelines for sexual crimes involving children.7 If the victim was 12 years
old or younger, the guidelines provide that offenders released after the
statutory minimum jail time are subject to supervision by the department
of corrections and are required to participate in continuous GPS
monitoring as set forth under § 46-23-1010 for the remainder of the
offender’s life.8 The district court found these statutes required lifetime
GPS monitoring as a condition of Smith’s eventual parole or probation and
included it in his sentence.9
*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2021.
MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-5-625(1)(a), 45-5-625(5)(b)(ii) (2015).
2
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2; Appellee’s Response Brief at 1 (The jury found that Smith
knowingly made his stepdaughter dance on a “stripper pole” in her underwear.).
3
Id. at 3
4
Id. at 41.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 42.
7
See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-625.
8
Id. § 45-5-625(4)(b).
9
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 41.
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Smith did not object to this condition at sentencing but challenged the
constitutionality of the condition in the present appeal.10 Smith requested
that the Court strike the lifetime GPS monitoring condition from his
sentence.11
III.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Wesley Smith

Smith argues that § 45-5-625(4)(b) facially violates the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and
sections 10, 11, 22, and 28 of Article II of the Montana Constitution.
1.

Unreasonable Searches and Right to Privacy

Smith argues that lifetime GPS monitoring constitutes an ongoing
unreasonable search without probable cause, which violates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and violates
Montana’s right to individual privacy as set forth in Article II, section 10
of the Montana Constitution. Smith contends that Article II, section 10
provides “broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.”12
Smith relies on State v. Siegal,13 which established that the right to
privacy in Montana extends to the government’s use of technology in
searches, to argue GPS monitoring equates to an unlawful search.14 Smith
also cites Grady v. North Carolina15 in which the United States Supreme
Court defined GPS monitoring as a Fourth Amendment “search,” then
moves on to discuss GPS monitoring sentencing statutes that were found
unconstitutional in North Carolina,16 Georgia,17 and South Carolina.18
2.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Smith next shifts into a discussion of constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment under Article II, section 22 of the
Montana Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Smith notes the Montana sentencing statute at

10

Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 37, 41.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 44.
12
Id. at 35.
13
934 P.2d 176, 180 (1997) (holding that thermal imaging in a criminal investigation constitutes a
“search” and that the use of thermal imaging technology by the government without a search warrant
implicates individual privacy interests and requires a showing of a compelling state interest).
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 37.
15
575 U.S. 306 (2015) (holding that attaching location monitoring devices to individuals without their
consent constitutes a search).
16
North Carolina v. Grady, 831 S.E.2d 542 (N.C. 2019) (holding that lifetime GPS monitoring of
defendant based on their recidivist offender status was an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment search).
17
Park v. Georgia, 825 S.E.2d 147, 152–53 (Ga. 2019) (holding that a law mandating GPS monitoring
for “sexually dangerous predators” after they completed their sentences violated the Fourth
Amendment).
18
South Carolina v. Ross, 815 S.E.2d 754, 755, 758 (S.C. 2018) (holding that GPS monitoring for
sexual offenders who fail to register must be analyzed case-by-case, rather than being an automatic
consequence of failure to register); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 38–39.
11
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issue does not provide for any “individualized determination” before a
defendant is sentenced to lifetime GPS monitoring.19
Smith emphasizes several “mitigating circumstances”— this was his
first sexual offense, the offense did not involve touching, and he has not
exhibited patterns of sexual abuse, inter alia—that led to his designation
as a Level 1 sex offender.20 He argues that despite the mitigating factors
and his Level 1 designation, under the law, the statute mandated the district
court to impose the lifetime GPS monitoring condition.21 Smith does not
directly state that this sentencing condition constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. In his reply to the State’s Opening Brief, Smith contends that
the facts and circumstances of his own case do not change the fact that the
statute is overbroad and allows no judicial discretion over whether lifetime
GPS monitoring is excessive or grossly disproportionate in certain cases.22
3.

Restoration of Rights

Smith then attacks the sentence itself. He notes that his probation and
parole officers could recommend a conditional discharge of his postrelease supervision, but that even then, the lifetime GPS monitoring
requirement would remain in effect.23 Smith asserts that the monitoring
requirement subjects defendants who have had their sentences fully
discharged to continued punishment and invasions of privacy in violation
of Article II, section 28 of the Montana Constitution.24 He also argues it
violates § 46-18-801(2) which mandates that “all civil rights” be restored
once a sentence expires so that defendant is left in the same position as “if
the conviction had not occurred.” 25
B.

Appellee State of Montana

The State contends that Smith’s claim should be dismissed whether it
is deemed to be a facial or an as-applied constitutional challenge. The State
argues Smith failed to meet his burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the sentencing statute in question is unconstitutional.26 The
State notes that Smith must prove that either no set of circumstances exist
under which the statute would be constitutional or that the statute “lacks a
‘plainly legitimate sweep’” to succeed as a facial challenge.27
The State argues that Smith failed to sufficiently explain how
Montana’s right of privacy and search and seizure protections make this
sentencing condition unconstitutional and how the condition qualifies as
cruel and unusual punishment.28 The State contends that to establish the
statute’s unconstitutional reach, Smith must prove that lifetime GPS
monitoring “would be an unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible
19

Id.
Id. at 40–41.
Id.
22
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9.
23
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 42–43.
24
Id. at 43.
25
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-801(2).
26
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 36.
27
Id. at 36 (quoting In re S.M., 403 P.3d 324, 326 (Mont. 2017)).
28
Id. at 38–39.
20
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search in every case, for every type of offense, and for every offender”
under every type of criminal conduct captured by the act.29 The State
argues that instead of doing that, Smith has merely described his own facts
and mitigating circumstances and argued about why the statute is
unreasonable as it is applied to him.30
As such, the State describes Smith’s claims as a “thinly veiled ‘asapplied’ challenge.”31 The State argues that under the State v. Lenihan32
rule, Smith cannot bring the claim on appeal without having first objected
to the sentencing condition at the sentencing hearing.33 The State contends
that because Smith’s claim should be considered an as-applied challenge,
Smith waived the challenge by not objecting at sentencing, so his claim is
not reviewable by the Court.34
The State asks the Court to dismiss the challenge.35
IV.

ANALYSIS

Two issues raised by the parties likely merit most of the attention
during the oral argument: (1) whether or not Smith raises an as-applied
challenge or a facial challenge to the statute, and (2) whether or not
continued GPS monitoring is an unconstitutional restriction on individuals
who have completely served their sentences.
A.

As-Applied or Facial Challenge

The Court could make quick work of Smith’s claim if it believes that
Smith’s challenge is an as-applied challenge as the State contends. Asapplied challenges are not reviewable without prior objection at
sentencing, while facial claims may be raised on appeal without first
objecting.36 A facial claim asserts that a statute is unconstitutional on its
face by attacking the constitutionality of the statute itself.37 As-applied
challenges, on the other hand, attack the constitutionality of the individual
sentence in question.38
The State’s argument that Smith’s cruel and unusual punishment
assertions look like an as-applied challenge has merit. Smith’s short
discussion of cruel and unusual punishment revolves around the mitigating
circumstances the district court analyzed when designating Smith a lowrisk Level 1 sexual offender.39 Although not expressly stated, Smith’s
position appears to be that because he, individually, has been deemed to
be a low-risk offender, lifetime GPS monitoring is disproportionate to his
crime and is therefore cruel and unusual. This looks like a challenge to the
sentence rather than the statute, so it is more “as-applied” than “facial” in
nature. If the Court follows this logic, then it should find that Smith waived
29

Id. at 39.
Id.
31
Id. at 40.
32
602 P.2d 997, 1000 (Mont. 1979).
33
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 40.
34
Id. at 41.
35
Id. at 41.
36
State v. Yang, 452 P.3d 897, 900 (Mont. 2019).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 39–41.
30
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this cruel and unusual punishment claim when he did not object to the
condition at sentencing.
Smith’s other constitutional assertions, however, are more broadly
tailored toward the sentencing statute and are not directed at Smith’s
individualized circumstances. For example, Smith does not mention his
own facts or circumstances when arguing that the sentencing condition is
an unequivocally unreasonable search and infringement on the restoration
of rights post-sentence completion. These claims will likely be found to
be facial challenges to the sentencing statute and, thus, valid on appeal.
Additionally, given that the Court granted oral argument on this
constitutional issue, it is unlikely that it views the entirety of Smith’s
argument as being an as-applied challenge.
B.

Unreasonable Searches and Restoration of Rights

The heart of the oral argument will likely lie in discussing the
developing body of caselaw surrounding GPS monitoring and its
applicability and persuasiveness in Montana. In his Opening Brief, Smith
did not establish a clear argument as to why the sentencing condition
should be considered an unreasonable search, but he will likely elaborate
on that contention in his oral argument by analogizing § 45-5-625(4)(b) to
the statutes struck down by other state courts.
The State will likely counter by distinguishing the other statutes from
§ 45-5-625(4)(b) and reiterating that regardless of what other states are
doing, Smith failed to meet his burden to show that “no set of
circumstances exists” under which the statute would be valid or that the
statute lacks a “plainly legitimate sweep.”40
The Court might look favorably on the state cases and follow the
burgeoning movement to strike down unqualified lifetime GPS monitoring
statutes, but the Court’s interest in these out-of-state decisions is unclear.
If the Court focuses on whether or not Smith has met his burden under the
In re S.M. test cited by the State, Smith may have trouble in proving that
lifetime GPS monitoring is never under any circumstances acceptable (i.e.,
consider the case of a high-risk violent Level 3 sexual offender). Unless
Smith can establish that GPS monitoring constitutes an ongoing and
unreasonable search at all times, Smith will not likely have met his burden.
Smith’s final constitutional argument—one that went entirely
unaddressed in the State’s response—is his most salient. Article II, section
28 requires that “[f]ull rights are restored by termination of state
supervision for any offense against the state.”41 Montana statutory law
doubles down on that premise by establishing that an individual who
serves their sentence is to have all of their rights returned “as if the
conviction had not occurred.”42
The Court has established that the restoration of rights is not allencompassing and only applies to “those rights commonly considered to
be political and civil rights” like the right to vote, serve as a juror, and hold

40

See Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 38 (quoting In re S.M., 403 P.3d 324, 326 (Mont.
2017)).
41
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28.
42
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-801(2).
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public office.43 Pertinently, the Court has found that post-sentence sex
offender registration requirements that effect an individual’s “right to exist
free from state regulation, to travel, and to pursue employment” do not
violate Article II, section 28.44
Here, § 45-5-625(4)(b) mandates lifetime GPS monitoring regardless
of whether or not a sentence is discharged. Smith might argue that
Montana’s individual right to privacy is a civil right in the state of Montana
that should be fully restored to people who have served their sentences.
That argument holds weight, as the Court and the Montana Constitution
recognize the right of privacy as being one that can be overcome only by
a compelling state interest.45
Given the broad, indiscriminatory nature of the GPS monitoring
requirement and its applicability to all defendants, regardless of the
seriousness of their crimes, the State may struggle to assert a compelling
interest sufficient to overcome the right of privacy. If Smith makes this
argument and the State does not provide a sufficient governmental interest
in perpetually limiting privacy rights for all sex offenders subject to § 455-625(4)(b), the Court should hold the statute unconstitutional under
Article II, section 28.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court is unlikely to dismiss all of Smith’s claims on the basis that
they are as-applied constitutional challenges. Smith might not persuade
the Court he met his burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional
under all circumstances based solely on his discussion of out-of-state case
law. It is possible, however, that the Court will determine that the
unqualified lifetime GPS monitoring requirement in § 45-5-625(4)(b) is
unconstitutional under Article II, section 28 because it continues to restrict
the fundamental right to privacy of individuals even after they have served
their sentence. No matter how the Court decides this case, the decision will
set a precedent for Montana on GPS monitoring as a sentencing condition
moving forward.

43
44
45

State v. Gafford, 563 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Mont. 1977).
Wagner v. State, 85 P.3d 750, 752-53 (Mont. 2004).
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.

